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INTRODUCTION

HIS article surveys the most significant changes in intellectual
property law in the past year.' The article considers only those
decisions that are precedential in Texas, or likely to influence the
practice of law in the state. Thus, the cases cited focus on the decisions of
the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and
Federal Circuits. For developments in trademark and copyright law, the
Fifth Circuit's authority is binding, but other Circuits, such as the Second
and Ninth, are considered highly persuasive. Because all cases concerning a substantive issue of patent law are appealed to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, decisions from the Federal Circuit during
the Survey period are also included in this article. 2
2007 was another active year in intellectual property law. Together, the
courts addressed many areas of patent litigation considered ripe for reform, even as Congress continues to show interest in reforming the patent
statutes. The United States Supreme Court continued its trend of lowering the bar for challenging patents and restricting the scope of patent
rights. The Federal Circuit responded to certain Supreme Court decisions, raised the bar for enhanced damages, and reconsidered the patentable scope of business methods. Elsewhere, the Internet spurred
developments in trademark and copyright law. In particular, Internet
search engines have been the foremost battleground with disputes con1. The views expressed in this article are the views of the individual authors, and are
not necessarily those of Haynes and Boone, LLP, its attorneys, or any of its clients.
Messrs. McCombs, Philbin, and Hodges wish to thank Don Tiller for his invaluable assis-

tance with this paper.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2000); see also Deprenyl Animal Health, Inc. v. Univ. of Toronto

Innovations Found., 297 F.3d 1343, 1348-49 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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cerning search keywords and meta tags used to direct traffic to video
sharing websites. Also, trademark applicants experienced an increased
cost for incorrectly identifying the underlying goods or services for which
a mark is sought. Technology and intellectual property continue to be
increasingly important in our economy, and the Supreme Court and Congress are responding accordingly.
II.

A.

PATENT UPDATE

THE SUPREME COURT ON PATENTS

Standing for DeclaratoryJudgments

1.

Under certain circumstances, an accused patent infringer may bring
suit against a patentee by seeking a declaratory judgment. The Declaratory Judgment Act allows a party to an "actual controversy" to seek a3
declaration of his "rights and other legal relations" in a federal court.
The declaration of rights is a court judgment that does not provide for or
4
order enforcement of those rights.
Lessened Immunity to Suit-Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.

a.

The Supreme Court decided MedImmune against the background of
Federal Circuit jurisprudence barring a licensee from seeking a declara5
tory judgment while still complying with its licensing agreement. Prior6
Inc.,
Vysis,
v.
Inc.
Gen-Probe
in
Circuit,
to MedImmune, the Federal
held that a suit is nonjusticiable when a compliant licensee seeks a declaratory judgment of invalidity, unenforceability, or scope of a licensed patent.7 As a result, the MedImmune district court invoked Gen-Probe and
dismissed MedImmune's declaratory judgment action 8 and likewise the
Federal Circuit invoked Gen-Probe in affirming the district court's decision.9 In upholding MedImmune's declaratory judgment action and reversing the Federal Circuit,10 the Supreme Court overruled Gen-Probe's
bar on declaratory judgment for compliant licensee. 1 ' The Court also rejected the Federal Circuit's reasonable-apprehension-of-suit test that
12
served as a basis for the bar.
The Gen-Probe rule was an extension of the Federal Circuit's two-part
"pragmatic inquiry" in analyzing the totality of the circumstances for an
13
Article III controversy, which stated:
3. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 770-71 (2006) (citing 28

U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2000)).

4. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 859 (8th Ed.
5. MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 768.
6. 359 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

2004).

Id. at 1381.
MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 768.
Id.
Id. at 777.
Id. at 774.
Id. at 774 n.il.
Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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There must be both (1) an explicit threat or other action by the patentee, which creates a reasonable apprehension on the part of the
declaratory judgment plaintiff that it will face an infringement suit,
and (2) present activity [by the declaratory judgment plaintiff] which
could constitute infringement or concrete steps taken [by the declar14
atory judgment plaintiff] with the intent to conduct such activity.
It was in the first prong of the inquiry, the reasonable-apprehension-ofsuit test, where a compliant licensee necessarily failed to establish a
controversy.' 5
In its analysis, the Court reiterated that an Article III controversy exists where the totality of the circumstances establishes "that there is substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of
sufficient immediacy and reality .... -16 To find a suit justiciable, the
Court required:
that the dispute be "definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests"; and that it be "real
and substantial" and "admi[t] of specific relief through a decree of a
conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what
7
the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.'
Writing for an eight-Justice majority, Justice Scalia noted that the purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act was to ameliorate the dilemma
inherent in the choice between: (1) abandoning rights; and (2) exercising
those rights at the risk of liability.1 8 Absent an imminent threat of harm,
a declaratory judgment action may be justiciable if the plaintiff was effectively coerced, by the risk of liability, to abandon its rights so as to remove the threat of harm. 19 Scalia further noted that, contrary to the
Federal Circuit's Gen-Probe analysis, an action may be justiciable regardless of whether the coercive risk of liability lies with the government or a
private party-in either case, the risk of damages arising from infringement may be sufficiently coercive. 20 Stating in a footnote that the reasonable-apprehension-of-suit test conflicts with Supreme Court precedent, 21
the Court stated that a party need not breach a license agreement at the
risk of treble damages and a business-crippling injunction before seeking
22
a declaration of its rights.

14. Id. at 1380 (quoting BP Chems. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 978 (Fed.

Cir. 1993)).
15. Id. at 1381.
16. MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 771 (citing Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S.
270, 273 (1941)).
17. Id. (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937)).
18. Id. at 772-73 (citing Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 152 (1967)).
19. Id. at 773.
20. Id. at 774 (citing Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359, 365 (1943)).
21. Id. at 774 n.11.
22. See id. at 775, 777.
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Since the MedImmune opinion was issued, the Federal Circuit has upheld the vast majority of declaratory judgment actions seeking a finding
23
of patent noninfringement or invalidity as justiciable.
i.

Giving Standing a Leg Up-SanDisk Corp. v.
24
STMicroelectronics, Inc.

While negotiating a cross-licensing agreement, STMicroelectronics
("ST") alleged that various SanDisk activities and products infringed ST's
patents on flash memory technology.25 ST supported the allegation with
detailed written and oral analyses of the patent claims and SanDisk's
products. 2 6 After six months of negotiation failed to yield an agreement,
SanDisk sued ST seeking a declaratory judgment of noninfringement and
invalidity of ST's patents. 27 The district court determined that SanDisk
did not have a reasonable apprehension of suit and dismissed the declara28
tory judgment action as nonjusticiable.
The Federal Circuit held that SanDisk's declaratory judgment action
was justiciable even though ST never threatened an infringement suit,
expressed a lack of intent to sue, and expressed a willingness to continue
the licensing negotiations. 29 Applying MedImmune, the Federal Circuit
reasoned that a declaratory judgment action may be justiciable when the
plaintiff is confronted with the dilemma of choosing between "pursuing
arguably illegal behavior" and "abandoning that which he claims a right
to do."'30 Specifically, the court held that an Article III controversy arises
when "a patentee asserts rights under a patent based on certain identified
ongoing or planned activity of another party, and where that party contends that it has the right to engage in the accused activity without
license ....",31 ST's declaratory judgment action was justiciable because
ST claimed a right to a royalty based on its detailed infringement analysis
'32
of SanDisk's "specific, identified activity."
23. See, e.g., Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278, 1291 (Fed.
Cir. 2008); Micron Tech. v. Mosaid Techs., 518 F.3d 897, 901-03 (Fed. Cir. 2008); SanDisk
Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Teva Pharms. USA,
Inc. v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Sony Elecs., Inc. v.
Guardian Media Techs., Ltd., 497 F.3d 1271, 1285-87 (Fed. Cir. 2007); but see Benitec
Austl., Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc., 495 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (not justiciable).
24. 480 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
25. Id. at 1374-75.

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

1375.
1376.
1381-83.
1381.
1382.
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ii. New Drug Test Now FDA Approved-Teva Pharmaceuticals
33
USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp.
Novartis listed five patents with the U.S. Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") as part of a new drug application ("NDA") based on a
particular compound. 34 Four of those patents were directed to the drug's
therapeutic use and one was directed at its composition. 35 Teva filed an
abbreviated new drug application ("ANDA") with the FDA for a generic
version of a drug based on the same compound, certifying that its drug
did not infringe any of the Novartis patents or that the patents were invalid. 36 Novartis sued Teva for infringement 37 of its composition patent and
Teva sought a declaratory judgment of invalidity or noninfringement of
the four therapeutic-use patents. 38 The district court found that Teva
failed to meet the reasonable-apprehension-of-imminent-suit 39 test and
40
dismissed the declaratory judgment action for want of jurisdiction.
The Federal Circuit looked to the totality of the circumstances, as required by MedImmune, and held that the declaratory judgment action
was justiciable. 4 1 The court noted five circumstances that together supported justiciability:
(1) Novartis listed its patents with the FDA, indicating that Novartis
could42reasonably assert an infringement claim for use of the generic
drug;

43
(2) Teva infringed the Novartis patents when it filed the ANDA;
(3) Congress intended
early resolution of patent disputes involving
44

generic drugs;

33. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
34. Id. at 1334.
35. Id.
36. Id. An ANDA is used to speed FDA approval of a generic drug by relying on the
previous approval of bioequivalent drug. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
§ 505(j), 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2000). As part of the application, the applicant must certify
that any patents claiming the approved bioequivalent drug: have not been filed; have expired; will expire on a specified date; or are invalid or will not be infringed by the generic.
Id.
37. See Teva, 482 F.3d at 1340. Filing an ANDA is a technical infringement of the
Novartis patents under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) (2000).
38. Teva, 482 F.3d at 1334-35.
39. The reasonable-apprehension-of-imminent-suit test is an evolved form of the reasonable-apprehension-of-suit test and was similarly rejected in MedImmune. See Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genetech, Inc. 127 S. Ct. 764, 774 n.ll (2006).
40. Teva, 482 F.3d at 1335.
41. Id. at 1337, 1340, 1345-46.
42. Id. at 1341-42.
43. Id. at 1342. "It shall be an act of infringement to submit-(A) an application
under section 505(j) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act .....
35 U.S.C.
271(e)(2) (2000).
44. Teva, 482 F.3d at 1342-44. Specifically, the court noted the guidelines in 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(5)(C) (2000), outlining how and when an ANDA applicant can bring a declaratory
judgment action to obtain patent certainty; 35 U.S.C. 271(e)(5), granting jurisdiction to
such declaratory judgment actions; and discussing the congressional goal of allowing quick
introduction of cheap generic drugs to the market. Id. at 1343-44.
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(4) Novartis sued Teva for patent infringement of one of the FDAlisted patents; 45 and
(5) the FDA-listed patents not asserted in Novartis's 46suit against
Teva could be asserted against Teva in future litigation.
The court held that, under the circumstances, "Teva has experienced real
and actual injury" that is "traceable to Novartis' conduct" and that the
injury "can be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. '47 Accordingly,
the Federal Circuit held the declaratory judgment action to be
48
justiciable.
In addition, the court commented on the individual strength of each
circumstance, hinting that several would create a justiciable controversy
independent of the others. Because "Novartis would have an immediate
justiciable controversy against Teva as soon as Teva submitted the
ANDA," the Federal Circuit reasoned that submitting the ANDA
"should create a justiciable declatory judgment controversy" for Teva
against Novartis. 49 Similarly, the court explained that challenging a
FDA-listed patent via the ANDA certification, as did Teva, should make
a declaratory judgment action on the patent justiciable.50 Finally, the
court found that Novartis's prior infringement suit on one of the five
FDA-listed patents challenged by Teva's ANDA certification "is dispositive in establishing an actual declaratory judgment controversy as to all"
5
the challenged patents. '
2.

52
Patently Obvious-KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.

The Supreme Court decided KSR against the background of Federal
Circuit jurisprudence requiring a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to
combine elements of prior art references for the combination to be unpatentable for obviousness-the so-called TSM test.5 3 Applying the TSM
test, the district court held that Teleflex's claimed invention was obvious
because the nature of the problem addressed by the invention would motivate one having ordinary skill in the art to combine elements of the
prior art references in the fashion claimed. 54 However, the Federal Circuit held that the district court incorrectly applied the TSM test 55 finding
45. Id. at 1344-45.
46. Id. at 1345.

47. Id. at 1346.

48. Id.
49. Id. at 1342.
50. Id. at 1343 (stating that, in the context of an ANDA certification

challenge of a
patent, "the only circumstance in which a case or controversy might not exist would arise in
the rare circumstance in which the patent owner and brand drug company have given the
generic applicant a covenant not to sue, or otherwise formally acknowledge that the generic applicant's drug does not infringe").

51. Id. at 1344.
52. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
53. See Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 119 F. App'x 282, 285 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(unpublished).

54. Teleflex Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 298 F. Supp. 2d 581, 593-94, 596 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
55. Teleflex, 119 F. App'x at 288.
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that for the nature of the problem to suggest or motivate a combination,
the prior art references must address the precise problem addressed by
the patentee. 56 In reinstating the summary judgment of obviousness, the
Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit's rigid application of the
57
TSM test.
In opinions issued after the Supreme Court granted certiorari in KSR,
the Federal Circuit seemed to re-explain the TSM test as requiring a
more flexible approach. 58 Particularly, in DyStar Textilfarben GmbH &
Co. v. C.H. Patrick Co., the Federal Circuit articulated the test as requiring a motivation to combine in: (1) the prior art references; (2) the common knowledge; (3) the prior art as a whole; or (4) the nature of the
59
problem.
In KSR, the Supreme Court described the obviousness inquiry as "an
expansive and flexible -approach" and noted that the controlling framework from Graham v. John Deere Co. "set forth a broad inquiry and invited courts, where appropriate, to look at any secondary considerations
that would prove instructive."' 60 Additionally, the Court stated that
"[t]he combination of familiar elements according to known methods is
likely to be obvious when it does no more than yield predictable
results. "61

Interestingly, the unanimous court did not explicitly reject the TSM
test; rather, it rejected the Federal Circuit's rigid application of the test in
KSR. 62 While acknowledging that identifying a reason for one of ordinary skill in the art to combine familiar elements can be important to the
obviousness inquiry, Justice Kennedy noted that the dispositive factor is
the "objective reach of the claim."'63 He explained that the Federal Cir64
cuit's rigid application of the TSM test failed in four notable ways.
First, in focusing on the patentee's motivation, the Supreme Court
pointed out that the Federal Circuit had failed to analyze obviousness
from the perspective of one having ordinary skill in the art.65 Notably,
the Supreme Court distinguished the problem motivating the patentee
from the problems addressed by the invention. 66 Whereas the Federal
Circuit's rigid application of the TSM test focused on the "precise prob56. Id.
57. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1739.
58. See David L. McCombs et al., Intellectual Property Law, 60 SMU L. REV. 1141,
1152-54 (2007) (discussing the Federal Circuit's defense of the TSM test in In re Kahn, 441
F.3d 977 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2006);
and DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir.
2006)).
59. DyStar Textilfarben GmbH & Co. v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed.
Cir. 2006).
60. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1739 (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966)).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1742-1743.
63. Id. at 1741-42.
64. Id. at 1742.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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lem that the patentee was trying to solve," 67 the Supreme Court finds that
the proper inquiry focuses on problems known in the art and addressed
68
by the invention.
Second, in restricting prior art references to those designed to solve the
problems addressed by the invention, the Supreme Court found that the
Federal Circuit failed to account for the ordinary creativity of one having
skill in the art. 69 The Court explained that "[c]ommon sense teaches...
that familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes .... "70 Whereas the rigidly applied TSM test would not find nature-of-the-problem motivation to combine elements of prior art
references unless those references were directed to the same problem, the
Supreme Court holds that the proper inquiry considers a broader cate71
gory of prior art.
Third, the Supreme Court found that the Federal Circuit erred in failing to consider that a combination was obvious to try as evidence of obviousness. 72 The Court noted that one of ordinary skill in the art may be
motivated by "design need or market pressure" to try those "finite number of identified, predictable solutions . . . within his or her technical
grasp."'73 Whereas the rigidly applied TSM test teaches that a combination of elements of prior art references is not obvious merely because it is
obvious to try the combination, the Supreme Court found that "obvious
74
try" maybe the basis for finding obviousness in certain circumstances.
Finally, the Supreme Court explained that the Federal Circuit's rigid
application of the TSM test as a check on hindsight bias failed to allow
75
the factfinder to exercise common sense in determining obviousness.
76
Such a rigid test is neither required nor allowed by Court precedent.
3.

Holdings on the Intangible-Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp. 77

Unlike MedImmune and KSR, which were decided in the context of
then-prevailing Federal Circuit jurisprudence, the Microsoft-AT&T dispute involved a question of first impression. 78 The issue involved
Microsoft's operating system software and AT&T's patented speech67. Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 119 F. App'x 282, 288 (Fed. Cir. 2005).

68. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1742.
69. Id.

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.

73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1742-43.

76. Id.
77. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746 (2007).
78. AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The Federal
Circuit framed the issue as two questions: (1) whether software qualifies as a "component"
under 35 U.S.C. § 271 (f) and; (2) whether foreign-made copies of the software qualify as
supplied from the United States under § 271(f). Id. Under Federal Circuit precedent,
software qualified as a "component." Id. (citing Eolas Techs. Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 399
F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). The second question was one of first impression. Id.
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processor invention. 79 Microsoft stipulated that its licensing of the
software for use on computers sold in the United States contributorily
infringed AT&T's patent.8 0 As a result, the only remaining question was
whether Microsoft infringed the patent under § 271(f) by exporting a
master copy of the software to enable later copying and installation other
computers outside the United States. 81 Both the district court and the
82
Federal Circuit found Microsoft liable for infringement under § 271(f).
In reversing, the Supreme Court held that the software did not qualify as
a component until it became a computer-readable copy, 83 and that foreign-made copies of the software were not "supplied" from the United
84
States as § 271(f) requires.
Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsberg focused on the nature of
software in determining that the software could not be a component combinable 85with a computer unless it became a "computer-readable
'copy."
The Court described two ways in which software can be conceptualized: as abstract instructions "detached from any medium" or al''86
ternately as tangible copies of "the instructions encoded on a medium.
Reasoning that a tangible and an intangible thing cannot be combined,
the Court held that software in the abstract, "an idea without physical
87
embodiment," could not be combined with a computer, a tangible thing.
The Court also found that the ease with which tangible copies can be
made from abstract instructions does not warrant a different result. 88 As
a result, only tangible copies of software qualify as "components" that
89
can be combined with a tangible computer.
The Court next determined that "supplying" a component under
§ 271(f) from the United States does not include exporting a master copy
of the component from which further copies can be made. 90 Ginsberg
reasoned that regardless of the ease with which such copies can be produced from the master copy, copying is "an activity separate and distinct"
from supplying. 91 Only supplying the actual components-the tangible
copies of the software-from the United States will create liability for
92
infringement under § 271(f).
79. Microsoft Corp., 127 S. Ct. at 1750.

80. Id. at 1753.
81. Id. at 1750-51. Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f), it is infringement to supply a party
outside the United States with certain uncombined components from the United States
knowing that the components will be combined by the foreign party in an infringing manner. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2000).
82. Id. at 1753.
83. Id. at 1755.
84. Id. at 1757.
85. Id. at 1754-56.
86. Id. at 1754.
87. Id. at 1755, 1756 n.13.

88. Id. at 1756.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1756-57.
91. Id. (citing AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414 F.3d 1366, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
(Rader, J., dissenting)).
92. Id. at 1757.
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In finding no liability for Microsoft under § 271(f), the Court pointedly
refused to address two related issues: (1) whether an intangible component of an intangible invention can qualify as a section 271(f) component-or even if an intangible invention qualifies for a patent;93 and (2)
whether § 271(f) liability exists if the tangible copy of the software is re94
moved from the computer once the software is installed.
4.

To the Point of Conditional Exhaustion-Quanta Computer, Inc. v.
LG Electronics, Inc.

Just before the 2007 term began, the Supreme Court accepted and
scheduled for argument its next patent case, Quanta Computer, Inc. v.
LG Electronics, Inc., concerning the doctrine of patent exhaustion. 95 The
Court held oral argument on January 16, 2008, and a ruling is expected in
late spring or early summer of 2008.96 At issue is the extent to which it is
permissible for a patentee to hold downstream users of a patented article
liable for infringement, where those users obtained the article from an
entity who lawfully obtained the article from the patentee.
Generally, the doctrine of patent exhaustion holds that "an unconditional sale of a patented device exhausts the patentee's right to control
the purchaser's use of the device thereafter." 97 The facts of the case seem
to complicate the issue, however. LG Electronics, Inc. ("LGE") licensed
its entire patent portfolio to Intel Corporation ("Intel"), which then manufactured microprocessors for use in personal computers. However, in
the license agreement, LGE specified that Intel's customers were not permitted to combine the microprocessors with other, non-Intel parts in a
way that would violate LGE's patents. LGE required Intel to notify its
customers of this license provision, and Intel did so. Despite this warning, Intel's customers continued to use Intel microprocessors with components from other manufacturers, and LGE brought suit alleging
infringement.9 8
The Northern District of California found that, while there was no implied license, Intel's sale of the microprocessors with a license from LGE
exhausted LGE's patent rights against Intel's customers. 99 Although the
Federal Circuit agreed that there could be no implied license because of
the notice provided by Intel, it disagreed with the district court's applica93. Id. at 1756 n.13.
94. Id. at 1757 n.14. Justice Alito, in his three-justice concurrence, would have held
that liability ceases once the tangible copy is removed. Id. at 1762.
95. Quanta Computer, Inc., v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 28 (2007) (granting petition
for writ of certiorari).
96. The Supreme Court ruled on June 9,2008, after this year's Survey period. See
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008).
97. LG Elecs., Inc., v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing
Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. 544, 547 (1873)).
98. See id. at 1368; see also Am. Intellectual Prop. Law Ass'n, Supreme Court Will
Review Federal Circuit Law on Patent Exhaustion, AIPLA REPORTS, October 1, 2007.
99. See Bizcom Elecs., 453 F.3d at 1370.
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tion of patent exhaustion to Intel's sale.10 0 Instead, the Circuit found that
Intel's sale was conditional, and thus the exhaustion doctrine did not
10 1
apply.
What constitutes a "conditional sale" lies at the heart of the dispute.
The Federal Circuit relied on Supreme Court precedent in Mitchell v.
Hawley, from 1873, for its "axiomatic" statement of the exhaustion doctrine as tied to an unconditional sale.' 0 2 However, the Solicitor General
pointed out that the term "unconditional sale" as used in Mitchell, more
narrowly referred to a sale without a condition precedent. 0 3 Also, the
district court based its decision on the Supreme Court's 1942 decision in
United States v. Univis Lens Co., in which a patentee first licensed eyeglass lens blanks to a manufacturer and then sued the downstream wholesaler, finishers, and retailers. 10 4 The Federal Circuit did not address the
Univis decision, but instead relied on its own precedent in Mallinckrodt,
Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., which found no exhaustion where there was an expressly conditional sale or license. 10 5 The Supreme Court granted certiorari precisely to review this line of cases.
Also of interest is the applicability of the exhaustion doctrine to
method claims. 10 6 Both the district court and the Federal Circuit held
that patent exhaustion did not apply to method claims; 10 7 however, the
Solicitor General cited several Supreme Court patent exhaustion deci10 8
sions regarding method patents and this may still be an open issue.
B.

THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT ON PATENTS

1. A Sea Change in Willfulness-In re Seagate Technology, LLC 10 9
In ruling on a mandamus action seeking protection of work product
and attorney-client privilege, the Federal Circuit changed its twenty-fiveyear-old standard for awarding enhanced damages under 35 U.S.C.
§ 284.110 In an infringement action, Seagate countered allegations of willful infringement with an advice-of-counsel defense. 1 ' In doing so, Sea100. Id. at 1369-70.
101. Id. at 1370.
102. Id. at 1369 (citing Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. 544, 547 (1873)).
103. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 20-21, Quanta Computer, Inc., v.
LG Elecs., Inc., No. 06-937 (2007).
104. See LG Elecs., Inc. v. Asustek Computer, Inc., 65 U.S.P.Q.2D 1589, 1593-98 (N.D.
Cal. 2002) (analyzing United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 246-51 (1942)).
105. See Bizcom Elecs., 453 F.3d at 1369-70 (citing Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc.
976 F.2d 700, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
106. See Mark R. Paterson, Reestablishing the Doctrine of Patent Exhaustion, 2007 Patently-O Patent L.J. 38, 41, http://www.patentlyo.com/lawjournal.
107. LG Elecs., 453 F.3d at 1370.
108. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 25-26, Quanta Computer, Inc., v.
LG Elecs., Inc., No. 06-937 (2007); see also Eric W. Hagen, Another Term, Another HighStakes Patent Case, IPLaw360, PORTFOLIO MEDIA, Oct. 24, 2007.
109. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
110. Id. at 1365; see 35 U.S.C. 284 (2000).
111. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1366. The court defines the advice-of-counsel defense as the
accused infringer attempting to "establish that due to reasonable reliance on advice from
counsel, its continued accused activities were done in good faith." Id. at 1369.
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gate waived attorney-client privilege and protection of work product
relating to the subject matter of opinion counsel's advice.' 12 The district
court held that the waiver extended to all counsel and ordered production
of related documents and testimony of trial counsel.1 1 3 Seagate argued
that the waiver did not extend to trial counsel and after being denied an
interlocutory appeal, petitioned the Federal Circuit for a writ of mandamus. 1 14 In holding that waiver did not extend to trial counsel, the en banc
court overruled its long standing affirmative-duty-of-care standard for
1 15
willful infringement in favor of an objective recklessness standard.
In Seagate, the court announced that the patentee now bears the burden and must show that the infringer willfully infringed in order to receive enhanced damages for willful infringement. 1 6 Generally, if a
district court finds willful infringement, it may award up to three times
the amount of actual infringement damages. 117 Reasoning that "willfulness" in the context of patent infringement should have the same meaning as in analogous violations of law, the court overruled its affirmativeduty-of-care standard 18 and held that to prove willfulness a patentee
must establish by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) the infringer's
actions had an "objectively high likelihood" of infringing a valid patent;
and (2) the infringer knew, or should have known, of this high risk of
infringement.119
In addition to revising the willfulness standard, the Federal Circuit
made two further rulings of interest. First, the court concluded that,
while a party waives attorney-client privilege when it raises the advice-ofcounsel defense, the scope of the waiver does not normally extend to
120
communications with trial counsel or trial counsel's work product.
Second, the court observed that the proper legal deterrent for reckless,
post-filing, willful infringement is generally a preliminary injunction, not
2
enhanced damages.' '
2.

Rub a Dub Dub, Three Men in a...
Machine, Manufacture, or
Composition of Matter-In re Bilski, In re Comiskey,
& In re Nuijten

In 2006, the Supreme Court first granted certiorari to consider whether
a method of using a scientific principle was patentable subject matter in
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 1370.
Id. at 1366-67.
Id.
Id. at 1371.
Id.
Id. at 1368 n.3 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000)); id. at 1368 (citing Beatrice Foods Co.

v. New England Printing & Lithographing Co., 923 F.2d 1576, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
118. Early in its history, the Federal Circuit established that a party having "actual no-

tice of another's patent rights ... has an affirmative duty" of care in determining whether it
is infringing the patent. Id. (quoting Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co.,
717 F.2d 1380, 1389-90 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).

119. Id. at 1370-71.
120. Id. at 1374.
121. Id. at 1374, 1376.
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the case of Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite, Inc., but
dismissed it as improvidently granted. 122 Writing for a three-justice dissent, Justice Breyer favored hearing the case and finding that the claimed
invention was unpatentable subject matter. 12 3 Breyer noted that the law
excludes "laws of nature, natural phenomenon, and abstract ideas" from
patent protection because "sometimes too much patent protection can
impede rather than 'promote the Progress of Science and the useful
Arts."1 24 According to Breyer, a decision from the Court "would help
diminish legal uncertainty in the area" and "could contribute to the important ongoing debate, among both specialists and generalists, as to
whether the patent system, as currently administered and enforced, adequately reflects the 'careful balance' that 'the federal patent laws . ..
embod[y].' "125
Perhaps corresponding to the Supreme Court's interest, the Federal
Circuit has also shown an interest in better defining, and potentially contracting, the scope of patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101. In
a single day, the Circuit ruled, in In re Nuijten, that a physical but transitory signal did not qualify as one of the four statutory categories of patentable matter 126 and, in In re Comiskey, that a mental process is not
patentable unless it has a practical application, and the process involves
"another class of statutory matter. ' 12 7 Two weeks later, in In re Bilski, a
panel of the court heard oral argument in an appeal of another rejected
method claim, and within five months, the court granted an en banc hear1 29
ing sua sponte 28 to consider what constitutes a patentable "process."'
In Nuitjen, the court determined that Nuitjen's invention directed to "a
signal with embedded supplemental data" was not patentable subject
matter.13o The court reasoned that although the claimed signal was necessarily physical, it was not a "process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter" and therefore not patentable.' 3 ' The court first
explained that its decision in State Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc. did not stand for the proposition that certain subject matter may be patentable without falling into one of the statutory categories,
but only that the actual category it falls into is irrelevant. 132 Next, the
122. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs, Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 125 (2006) (per
curiam). The patent at issue claimed a method of correlating high levels of a specific
amino acid in the blood with a vitamin deficiency. Id. at 129.
123. Id. at 126, 138.
124. Id. at 126 (internal citations omitted).
125. Id. at 138 (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141
(1989)).
126. In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
127. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
128. In re Bilski, 264 F. App'x 896, 897 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Ex Parte Bilski, Appeal 20022257, 2006 WL 4080055, at *1 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 26, 2006).
129. See Bilski, 264 F. App'x at 897.
130. Nuitjen, 500 F.3d at 1351.
131. Id. at 1351-53, 1357 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000)).
132. Id. at 1354 (citing State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149
F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
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court reasoned that the claimed signal in Nuilten was not an "act or a
series of acts" and thus, it was not a "process."'1 33 The court also explained that the signal did not "possess concrete structure" consisting of
mechanical devices or parts and, therefore, it was not a "machine. 1 34 In
addition, the court found that the claimed signal was not a "manufacture"
because the signal is not a "tangible article[ ] or commodit[y]."' 135 Finally,
as the signal is not "a chemical union, nor a gas, fluid, powder, or solid,"
the court found that it did not qualify as a "composition of matter."' 136
In Comiskey, Comiskey's invention directed to "a 'method for
mandatory arbitration resolution regarding one or more ...documents"'
was held unpatentable because it operates on "human intelligence
alone. 1 3 7 The court first determined that an abstract idea or algorithm
must have a practical application to qualify as patentable subject matter.' 38 Next, the court explained that an abstract idea or algorithm embodied in a process is patentable only if the process "operates on,
transforms, or otherwise involves... a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. '139 Thus, the court established that having a practical
application alone is insufficient to render a mental process-an abstract
idea-as patentable subject matter. 140
Further, the Circuit addressed the potential obviousness of creating a
machine to embody a mental process. It held that "[t]he routine addition
of modern electronics to an otherwise unpatentable invention typically
creates a prima facie case of obviousness.' 41 Thus, a court may consider
secondary evidence of nonobviousness stemming solely from the mental
process as irrelevant. 42 The court remanded the case to the Patent and
Trademark Office ("PTO") to determine "whether the addition of modern computers and communications devices would have been
43
obvious.'1
In Bilski, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences determined
that Bilski's invention directed to a commodities hedging method did not
qualify as a patentable process under 35 U.S.C. § 101.144 The Board first
rejected the method as a § 101 process because it did not "transform any
physical subject matter."'1 45 In addition, the Board rejected the method
133. Id. at 1355.
134. Id. at 1355-56.
135. Id. at 1356-57.

136. Id. at 1357.

137. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1368-69, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007).

138. Id. at 1376.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1377.
141. Id. at 1380.

142. Id. (stating that a "long-felt need for the unpatentable mental process itself" is not
pertinent evidence).
143. Id. at 1381.
144. Ex Parte Bilski Appeal 2002-2257, 2006 WL 4080055, at *2 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 26,
2006).

145. Id. at *18 (defining "physical subject matter" as "matter or some form of energy").
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because it was an abstract idea. 146 Finally, although the Board interpreted the "useful, concrete and tangible result" test of State Street and
AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc. to be limited to processes
that transform data by a machine, the Board nevertheless invoked that
test "to the extent that State Street applies to non-machine-implemented
process claims" to reject the hedging method. 147 On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the PTO welcomed increased clarity on the patentability of
148 The
business concepts that do not involve a transformation of data.
court, sua sponte, granted an en banc hearing to address the issues:
(1) Whether claim 1 of the 08/833,892 patent application claims patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101?
(2) What standard should govern in determining whether a process
is patent-eligible subject matter under [§] 101?
(3) Whether the claimed subject matter is not patent-eligible because it constitutes an abstract idea or mental process; when does a
claim that contains both mental and physical steps create patent-eligible subject matter?
(4) Whether a method or process must result in a physical transformation of an article or be tied to a machine to be patent-eligible
subject matter under [§] 101?
(5) Whether it is appropriate to reconsider State Street Bank & Trust
Co. v. Signature FinancialGroup, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed .Cir.1998),
and AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc., 172 F .3d 1352
if so, whether those cases should be
(Fed.Cir.1999), in this case1 4 and,
9
overruled in any respect?
on May 8, 2008. However no decision
Oral arguments in Bilski occurred
150
has been rendered to date.
3. Designs of Bottled Saints and Buffered Goddesses-Arminak &
Associates, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Calmar, Inc. and Egyptian
Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc.
Under Federal Circuit jurisprudence, determination of infringement of
a design patent under 35 U.S.C. § 289 involves first construing the patent
1 51
claim and then comparing the construed claim to the accused design.
Infringement exists if: (1) the designs are so similar that an ordinary observer would be deceived into purchasing the accused design believing it
to be the patented design (the ordinary-observer test); and (2) "the ac146. Id. at *20-21.
147. Id. at *2, *21-22 (citing AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) and State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed.
Cir. 1998))
148. Brief for Appellee Director of the U.S.P.T.O at 4, In re Bilski, No. 2007-1130 (Fed.
Cir. Feb. 15, 2008).
149. In re Bilski, 264 F. App'x 896, 897 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
150. A recording of the oral arguments may be found on the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals website. Oral Argument, http://www.oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/searchscript.asp (enter Case No. 2007-1130, hit search, and select recordings from May 8, 2008).
151. See Arminak & Assocs., Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Calmar, Inc., 501 F.3d 1314, 1319-20
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2000)).
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cused design appropriated the novelty which distinguishes the patented
design from the prior art" (the point-of-novelty test) 1 52
The Federal Circuit has also expressed an interest in clarifying what
constitutes infringement of a design patent under 35 U.S.C. § 289. First,
in detailing its ordinary-observer test for assessing infringement of a design patent, the court held that the "ordinary observer" with respect to a
component of an end product is the purchaser of the component, rather
than the purchaser of the end product.1 53 Later, the court granted an en
banc rehearing of a noninfringement holding to consider its point-of-nov154
elty test.
In Arminak & Associates, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Calmar, Inc., the Federal Circuit found that patents that claimed ornamental designs for a trigger sprayer were not infringed because the ordinary observer-the
purchaser of the trigger sprayer-would not be deceived by the design. 155
Calmar and Arminak both sell trigger sprayers to manufacturers of liquid
household products, who in turn incorporate the sprayer in the final retail
product. 156 The district court held that since the industrial purchaser who
purchased the sprayers for the household products manufacturer would
not be deceived by the similarity of Armanak's design to Calmar's patented design, Arminak did not infringe Calmar's patent. 157 In affirming
the district court, the Federal Circuit agreed that the proper "ordinary
observer" in such an infringement analysis is the industrial purchaser of
the component, rather than the retail purchaser of the finished
1 58
product.
In Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., a Federal Circuit panel first
held that the patented shape of a fingernail buffer was not infringed because the claimed point of novelty-a combination of prior-art elements-was not a nontrivial advance over the prior art.159 The panel
stated that the point-of-novelty test can be satisfied by a combination of
individually known prior-art elements only if the combination is a "nontrivial advance over the prior art."1 60 The panel then noted that the infringement and validity analyses for design patents are often conflated
and determined that, in the context of a combination of prior art elements in the point-of-novelty test, an obviousness-style nontriviality test
is more appropriate than an anticipation test. 161
Egyptian Goddess, the patentee, successfully petitioned for an en banc
152. Id. at 1320.
153. Id. at 1323.
154. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 256 F. App'x 357, 357 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
155. Arminak & Assocs., 501 F.3d at 1318.
156. See id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1323.
159. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 498 F.3d 1354, 1355-56, 1358 (Fed. Cir.
2007), vacated, 256 F. App'x 357 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
160. Id. at 1357.
161. Id. at 1358 n.3.
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rehearing.1 62 In granting the rehearing, the Federal Circuit vacated its
earlier decision and stated the issues to be addressed as:
1) Should "point of novelty" be a test for infringement [sic] of design
patent?
2) If so, (a) should the court adopt the nontrivial advance test
adopted by the panel majority in this case; (b) should the point of
novelty test be part of the patentee's burden on infringement or
should it be an available defense; (c) should a design patentee, in
defining a point of novelty, be permitted to divide closely related or
ornamentally integrated features of the patented design to match
features contained in an accused design; (d) should it be permissible
to find more than one "point of novelty" in a patented design; and
(e) should the overall appearance of a design be permitted to be a
point of novelty? See Lawman Armor Corp. v. Winner Int'l, LLC,
449 F.3d 1190 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
3) Should claim construction apply to design patents, and, if so, what
role should that construction play in the infringement analysis? See
Elmer v. ICC Fabricating,Inc., 67 F.3d 1571, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1995).163
4.

Keeping Paice with the Courts-PaiceLLC v. Toyota Motor Corp.

The Supreme Court's ruling in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L. C. left
district courts to fashion new relief, other than an injunction, in patent
cases involving continuing infringement after an injunction has been denied. 164 In Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., the Federal Circuit deteraward an ongoing royalty and the judge
mined that a district court may 165
may determine the royalty rate.
Within months of the eBay decision, the Eastern District of Texas decided a case involving a non-practicing patentee, Paice, asserting its patent rights against Toyota. 166 The trial court held that Toyota infringed
Paice's patents but that a permanent injunction was not appropriate
under eBay.167 The court did, however, award damages for future acts of
infringement in the form of an ongoing royalty at a rate determined by
168 Toyota appealed
the court and to be in effect for the life of the patent.
holding and Paice appealed the imposition of the ongothe infringement
1 69
royalty.
ing
After affirming on infringement, the Federal Circuit determined that
the district court had the authority, under 35 U.S.C. § 283, to declare
Toyota's continuing infringement permissible in exchange for a court-im162. Egyptian Goddess, 256 F. App'x at 357.
163. Id. at 357-58.
164. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006) (requiring a patentee to satisfy the generally applicable four-factor test to qualify for a permanent injunction from continued patent infringement).
165. Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1314-15 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
166. Id. at 1302-03.
167. Id. at 1303.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1296.
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posed ongoing royalty. 170 In finding the statutory authority, the appellate
court noted that it has upheld such damages without "dispute as to the
district court's authority to craft such a remedy"1 7 1 and that, in the context of antitrust violations, the Supreme Court has approved such
172
remedies.
Although the court has the authority to award ongoing royalties, they
are not to be awarded as a matter of course when an injunction is denied. 173 The district court "may wish to allow the parties to negotiate a
license ...

before imposing an ongoing royalty."'

74

Further, in remand-

ing on the issue of the ongoing royalty rate, the Federal Circuit noted that
the district court did not provide sufficient reasons for the royalty to permit a meaningful review for abuse of discretion.' 75
The Federal Circuit then held that the patentee did not have a Seventh
Amendment right to have a jury determine the ongoing royalty rate. 176
While conceding that there may be a Constitutional right to a jury trial to
determine damages, the Court reasoned that "not all monetary relief is
properly characterized as 'damages"' and that "the fact that monetary
relief is at issue ...does not, standing alone, warrant a jury trial."'1

77

Paice's assertions that the royalty constituted damages to be determined
by a jury were insufficient to demonstrate that it had a Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial on the amount of the ongoing royalty.1 78
C.

No Go

FOR THE

PTO-TAFAS V. DUDAS

In January 2006, the PTO proposed rule changes regarding continuingapplication, continued-examination, and claim-examination practice because PTO claimed it was overburdened with the number and complexity
of applications. 179 Under the proposed rules, applicants would be limited
to two continuation or continuation-in-part (CIP) applications and one
request for continued examination (RCE) per initial application.' 8 0 With
the proper showing of cause (or without, if justice requires) an applicant
may be granted a third continuation or CIP, or a second RCE. l8 1 Further, where the application contains in excess of five independent claims
or twenty-five total claims, the proposed rules also require submission of
170. Id. at 1314-15 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000)).
171. Id. at 1314 (citing Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d
613, 628 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
172. Id. (citing United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 59 (1973)).
173. Id. at 1314-15.
174. Id. Judge Rader argued that a district court must first allow the parties to negotiate a license or obtain their permission prior to setting the rate. Id. at 1316 (Rader, J.,
concurring).
175. Id. at 1316.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F. Supp. 2d 805, 808 (E.D. Va. 2008).

180. Id. at 809. Current rules do not limit the number of continuation or CIP applications or RCEs. Id.
181. Id.
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information on each claim to assist the examiner in determining patentadivisional applicability. 182 Other proposed changes eliminate voluntary 183
applications.
divisional
from
stemming
tions and CIPs
In separate actions, Triantafyllos Tafas and GlaxoSmithKline sued
under the Administrative Procedure Act seeking to permanently enjoin
the PTO from enacting the proposed rules. 184 The plaintiffs claimed that
the proposed rules constitute unlawful agency action. 185 The Eastern
186
District of Virginia consolidated the cases and found for the plaintiffs.
The court held that the PTO did not have the authority to promulgate
the proposed rules and granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment seeking a permanent injunction against the PTO's enactment of the
proposed rules.1 87 The court first interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) and determined that Congress had not granted the PTO the authority to issue
substantive rules or to make substantive interpretations of the Patent
Act.18 8 Under prevailing law, applicants had a right to file an unlimited
number of continuations. 189 Noting that the proposed rules represent a
"drastic departure" from the current understanding of the Patent Act, the
court held that the proposed rules affect existing individual rights and,
thus, the rules are substantive.1 90 Also the court explained that under
prevailing law, the PTO bears the burden of examination, and the proposed rule would place this burden on the applicant by requiring the ap9
plicant to search prior art and provide reasons for patentability.' '
D.

How

DID WE END

Up

HERE?-IN

RE VOLKSWAGEN

OF AMERICA, INC.

While In re Volkswagen of America, Inc.192 does not involve a patent or
even an intellectual property right, the Fifth Circuit's decision in has the
potential to significantly impact patent litigation. The Fifth Circuit overturned the venue decision by the Eastern District of Texas, a forum which
193
has become a leading venue for patent litigation in the United States.
The Volkswagen case involves a product liability claim resulting from the
rear-end collision of a Volkswagen Golf causing a girl's death.1 94 The
Marshall Division of the Eastern District of Texas denied Volkswagen's
182. Id. at 810. Current rules do not require such a submission. Id. at 816.
183. Id. Current rules allow for voluntary divisional applications and for CIPs from
divisional applications.
184. Id. at 808.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 807.
187. Id. at 817.
188. Id. at 811 (interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2) (2000)).
189. Id. at 814 (including CIPs and RCEs).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 816.
192. 506 F.3d 376 (5th Cir. 2007).
193. Dave Moore, IP Cases Head East, DALLAS BUSINESS JOURNAL, Feb. 22, 2008,
http://dallas.bizjournals.com/dallas/stories/2008/02/25/focusl.html.
194. In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 506 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2007).

2008]

Intellectual Property

motion to transfer to the Dallas Division of the Northern District of
Texas despite the following facts:
(1) the Volkswagen Golf was purchased in Dallas County, Texas; (2)
the accident occurred on a freeway in Dallas, Texas; (3) Dallas residents witnessed the accident; (4) Dallas police and paramedics responded and took action; (5) a Dallas doctor performed the autopsy;
(6) the third-party defendant lives in Dallas County, Texas; (7) none
of the plaintiffs live in the Marshall Division; (8) no known party or
significant non-party witness lives in the Marshall Division; and (9)
none of the facts giving rise to this suit occurred in the Marshall
Division. 195
The Fifth Circuit first found that the district court incorrectly applied
the standard for forum non conveniens to Volkswagen's motion to transfer venue. 196 However, the Fifth Circuit recognized the reason for this
error finding that its "precedents have not been the model of clarity,"
especially since the panel itself struggled to find a precedential case on
point. 197 The Fifth Circuit eventually concluded that the "moving party
must demonstrate that a transfer is '[flor the convenience of parties and
witnesses, in the interest of justice.' '"198 Significantly, the Fifth Circuit
reasoned that the deference for the plaintiff's choice of forum establishes
this burden on the moving party thereby implying that the plaintiff's
choice is not the only consideration.' 99
The Fifth Circuit next addressed the district court's evaluation of the
public and private interest. 200 First, in an early footnote, the Fifth Circuit
acknowledged a general issue with venue determinations, stating, "failure
to follow with some precision the test we have set out necessarily produces inconsistent results in [the Fifth] Circuit. Absent exceptional circumstances, the district courts of the Fifth Circuit must consider motions
to transfer under the rubric we have provided."'2 01
The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court on its evaluation of three of
the four private interest factors and the only contested public interest
factor. 20 2 Two of these factors are of particular interest here. First, for
the private interest factor that evaluated the cost of attendance for willing
witnesses, the Fifth Circuit disputed the district court's determination that
"Volkswagen did not submit sufficient information for the court to determine which of its witnesses were 'key."' 203 Instead, the Fifth Circuit discussed several witnesses and concluded, "these witnesses [appeared to
195. Id. at 378-79.
196. Id. at 380.
197. Id. at 384.
198. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
199. Id. Note that Fifth Circuit did not address the plaintiff's choice of forum in its
evaluation of the venue determination apart from its discussion where the burden of proof
lies.
200. See id. at 384-87.
201. Id. at 380 n.1.
202. Id. at 384-87.
203. Id. at 385.
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It then ruled that the district

court should not have ignored Fifth Circuit precedent establishing a 100mile threshold rule for evaluating inconvenience, especially after the disspecifically recognized that Marshall is 155 miles from
trict court
20 5
Dallas.
Second, the Fifth Circuit criticized the district court's evaluation of the
public interest factor recognizing "the local interest in having localized
interests decided at home. 20° 6 The Fifth Circuit observed that the district
court's findings that the factor weighed against transfer "[stood] in stark
contrast to [its] analysis in" prior caselaw, where "under virtually undistinguishable facts, [the court] held that this factor weighed heavily in favor
of transfer. ' 20 7 The district court reasoned that, "although the accident
occurred in the Dallas Division, the citizens of Marshall would be interested to know whether there are defective products offered for sale in...
the Marshall Division and whether they are being exposed to these products." ' 20 8 Observing that "there is no relevant factual connection to the

Marshall Division," the Fifth Circuit then explained the error in the district court's analysis:
The district court's provided rationales ... stretch logic in a manner

that eviscerates the public interest that this factor attempts to capture. The district court's provided rationales could apply to virtually
any judicial district and division in the United States; they leave no
room for consideration of those actually affected-directly and indiThus, the
rectly-by the controversies and events giving rise to a20 case.
9
district court committed a clear abuse of discretion.
Interestingly, the Fifth Circuit's treatment of these issues has not been
finalized since the Court has decided to have an en banc rehearing. 210 In
addition, the question of whether this abuse of discretion analysis will
apply to patent cases before the Federal Circuit still remains.
III.
A.

TRADEMARK UPDATE

FAILURE TO READ "THE SIGN" MAY CAUSE HURLEYHURLEY INTERNATIONAL

LLC

v.

VOLTA

The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (the "TIAB") further expanded the scope of its line of cases following Medinol Ltd. v. Neuro
Vasx, Inc. 211 when it voided the applicants' pending use-based trademark

application in Hurley InternationalLLC v. Volta. 212 In 2003 its decision
in Medinol Ltd. v. Neuro Vasx, Inc., the TTAB cancelled a registration
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id. at

386.

Id. at 385-86.
Id.
Id. at 387 (referencing In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d 201 (5th Cir. 2004)).
Id. at 386.
Id. at 387.
In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 517 F.3d 785 (5th Cir. 2008).
67 U.S.P.Q.2d 1205, 2003 TTAB LEXIS 227 (T.T.A.B. 2003).

212. 82 U.S.P.Q.2d 1339, 2007 TrAB LEXIS 10 (T.T.A.B. 2007).
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due to the owner's fraud in filing an Amendment to Allege Use which
with all goods listed in the
claimed that the mark was in use in connection
2 13
application, when in fact it was not.
Here, Paul and Jane Volta (collectively, the "Voltas"), Australian musicians, sought to register the mark THE SIGN along with an accompanying design. 214 Roughly a year after filing the application under section
215
Hurley Inter1(a) of the Lanham Act, it was published for opposition.
eventually
and
of
fraud,
because
part
in
mark
national, LLC opposed the
admission
alleged
the
Voltas'
on
based
judgment
summary
moved for
they had
application,
their
in
listed
services
that (1) with regard to some
(2) with
and
States,
United
the
within
not used the mark in commerce
anymark
the
used
not
had
they
of
services,
regard to a further subset
2 16
world.
the
in
where
The TTAB agreed and found fraud, voiding the Voltas' entire application.217 The Board reiterated that "[fIraud in procuring a trademark registration occurs when an applicant for registration knowingly makes
false, material representations of fact in connection with an application to
register.1 218 Here, not only did the Voltas falsely claim to be using the
mark in connection with certain services, but also they twice submitted
substitute specimens accompanied by signed declarations that again
falsely claimed that the mark was used in commerce in connection with
219
all listed services.
The applicants pleaded "ignorance and misunderstanding of the process of the Trademark Office," noting that they represented themselves
and that they had believed "use in commerce" encompassed use in Aussuffered "a
tralia and on their website. 220 They also noted that Paul Volta
2 21
major coronary infarct" while the application was pending.
The TTAB found the applicants' misunderstanding irrelevant. The
TTAB looked to objective indications of intent, rather than the applicants' subjective intent, citing Medinol.222 It also found their alleged confusion regarding the meaning of "use in commerce" to be
unreasonable. 223 Finally, and most significantly, TJAB found that it
made no difference that the registration of the mark had not yet
224
issued.
Significantly, after this decision, pending applications, like issued registrations, can be successfully opposed due to fraud for misstatements con213. Medinol, Ltd., 2003 TTAB LEXIS 227, at *18.
214. Hurley Int'l, 2007 TTAB LEXIS 10, at *1.

215. Id.; Lanham Act § 1(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a) (2006).
216. Hurley Int'l, 2007 TTAB LEXIS 10, at

*19.

217. Id. at *25.
218. Id. at *15.
219. Id. at *2.

*10-12.
*12.
*21-22 (internal citations omitted).
*22.
224. Id. at *17-18.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
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cerning use. The Board reasoned that, regardless of timing of
misrepresentations, "the result is the same-an application results in a
registration improperly accorded legal presumptions in connection with
goods and/or services on which the mark is not used. '225
However, the Board noted that the publication of the application was
still significant.2 26 In footnote five the TTrAB remarked in dicta that "a
misstatement ...

does not rise to the level of fraud where an applicant

amends the application prior to publication. 2 27
B.

CASE OF COUTURE FOR THE

DoGs-Louis VUITTON

MALLETIER

S.A. v. HA UTE DIGGITY Doc,LLC
In 2006, Congress passed the Trademark Dilution Revision Act
("TDRA"). 228 Trademark dilution is distinct from traditional trademark
infringement, because it focuses on protecting a mark's significance or
meaning, whereas the latter focuses on preventing consumer confusion. 229 The TDRA had two distinct effects. First, it established the standard for infringement as likelihood of confusion, rather than actual
confusion, overruling the Supreme Court's decision in Moseley v. V Secret
Catalogue, Inc. 230 Second, the TDRA outlined two distinct dilution
causes of action: dilution by blurring and dilution by tarnishment. 231
The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute
Diggity Dog, LLC is one of the first appellate decisions addressing trademark dilution under the TDRA. 232 Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A.
("LVM") is a French corporation that designs and manufactures luxury
luggage and handbags. 233 Haute Diggity Dog makes plush chew toys for
dogs which resemble luxury products and play on the products' names,
such as Furcedes (Mercedes), Dog Perignonn (Dom Perignon), and
Chewie Vuiton (Louis Vuitton), the last of which resulted in LVM's suit
for trademark infringement.2 34 Specifically, Haute Diggity Dog made a
plush chew toy shaped like a handbag that resembled a LVM handbag
and retailed for $1,190.235
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing all claims, first addressing traditional trademark infringement claims and then claims of dilution under the TDRA.2 36 As part of
225. Id. at *18.
226. Id. at *18 n.5.
227. Id. at *18 n.5 (citing Universal Overall Co. v. Stonecutter Mills Corp., 154 U.S.P.Q.
104 (C.C.P.A. 1967)).
228. See David L. McCombs, et al., Intellectual Property Law, 60 SMU L. REV. 1141,
1162-63 (2007).
229. Id. at 1162.
230. Id.; see also Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
231. McCombs, supra note 227, at 1161.
232. See Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252 (4th
Cir. 2007).
233. Id. at 256.
234. Id. at 258.
235. Id. at 257.
236. Id. at 256, 258, 263-64.
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its infringement analysis, the Fourth Circuit found that the Haute Diggity
Dog plush chew toy was a parody of the LVM handbag. 237 The chew toy
used a similar sounding name, a repetitious design that imitates the design on the handbag, and a "CV" mark similar to LVM's "LV" mark;
that the product would not be confused with
however, the court found238
the actual LVM handbag.
For its dilution analysis, the Fourth Circuit performed a more rigorous
analysis than the district court, but reached the same result. Regarding
blurring, the court first made clear that a parody would not be an automatic, complete defense, and found that the Haute Diggity Dog parody
did not fall under the explicit fair use exception in the TDRA. 239 That
exception was limited to "any fair use ... other than as a designation of
source for the person's own good or services, including use in connection
with... parodying. ' '240 However, even outside this exception, the defendant's use of parody was relevant to the evaluation of the six statutory
factors. 241 The court evaluated each of these factors, finding repeatedly
that the use of the parody tended to both enhance the asserted famous
mark's distinctiveness by stressing the differences between the parody
and the famous mark.2 42 The court did make the important distinction
that this would not be the case if the parody could be confused for the
asfamous mark itself, citing the examples of "DUPONT shoes, BUICK243
pirin, and KODAK pianos" used by the Supreme Court in Moseley.
The Fourth Circuit's discussion regarding tarnishment was less elaborate.244 LVM had only asserted one possible theory by which tarnishment
would occur, and the court found there was no record to support the theory.2 45 All remaining infringement theories followed the analyses the
Fourth Circuit had already discussed, and the court affirmed the district
2 46
court's dismissal of all of LVM's claims.

C.

TAG, YOU'RE IT! . . . IN A META SORTA WAY:
S.S.C. LTD. V. SETTLEMENT FUNDING

J.G.

WENTWORTH,

LLC

Whether the use of trademarks as keywords in pay-for-placement internet searches or as meta tags in website hypertext markup language
("HTML") code can constitute trademark infringement under the Lanham Act has become an issue of some debate. 247 Search engine opera237.

Id. at 260.

238. Id. at 260-61.
239. Id. at 266.
240. Id. at 266 (emphasis added in court's opinion) (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125 (a)(ii)
(West 2006)).
241. Id. at 267.
242. Id. at 267-68.
243. Id. at 268 (citing Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 431 (2003)).
244. Id.
245. Id. at 268-69.
246. Id. at 256-57, 270.
247. See, e.g., Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393, 397-400 (N.D.N.Y.
2006).

SMU LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

tors, such as Google, Inc., who sell trademarks as keywords have been a
target in these cases. 248 Similarly, advertisers who pay a search engine
operator to return links to the advertiser's website as a result of searches
for a competitor's trademark have also been targeted.2 4 9 Courts are split
as to whether such use of a trademark is "use in commerce" as required
by the Lanham Act.2 50 Some courts hold that because the trademark is
never communicated to the public, it is analogous to an "individual's pri251
vate thoughts" and thereby is not a use in commerce.
In J.G. Wentworth, S.S.C. Ltd. P'ship v. Settlement Funding LLC, an
infringement action against an advertiser, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently introduced a novel twist to this debate. 252 In granting
the defendant's motion to dismiss the infringement action, the J.G.
Wentworth court held that while the advertiser's use of the trademarks as
keywords in the pay-for-placement search engine or meta tags in the website's source code was "use in commerce," such use does not create a
2 53
likelihood of confusion.
The defendant, Settlement Funding LLC ("SF"), used the plaintiff's
trademarks, "J.G. Wentworth" and "JG Wentworth," as keywords in
Google's AdWords program and as keyword meta tags in the HTML
code for SF's website. 25 4 As AdWord keywords, the marks, when entered as search terms in Google's search engine, trigger Google's program to display a link to SF's website in Google's "Sponsored Link"
section of the search results page. 255 As keyword meta tags, the marks,
when entered as search terms in various Internet search engines, may
trigger the engine to create a link to SF's website along with other stan25 6
dard results.
Although SF's use of the trademarks left the marks invisible to potential consumers, its use was still "use" under the Lanham Act.2 57 In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that the sponsored ads and search
results established "an opportunity to reach consumers" and is thus unlike "an individual's private thoughts. '258 Such use had "crossed the line
259
from internal use to use in commerce under the Lanham Act."
The court nevertheless held that, as a matter of law, SF had not in248.
249.
250.
251.

Id.
Id. at 397.
Id. at 399-400.
See, e.g., Merck & Co., Inc. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d

402,415 (S.D.N.Y. (2006)) (quoting 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400,

409 (2d Cir. 2005)).
252. J.G. Wentworth, S.S.C. Ltd. P'ship v. Settlement Funding, LLC, 85 U.S. P.Q.2d
1780 (E.D. Pa. 2007).

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

Id. at 1785-86.
Id. at 1782.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1785.
Id.
Id.
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fringed J.G. Wentworth's trademarks. 2 60 Because the search engine and
AdWord links to SF's website do not display the trademarks, there is no
likelihood of confusion. 26 1 Noting that search engines do not take a potential customer to the linked website but rather to a search results page,
the court refused to extend initial confusion protection to include Internet keywords.2 62 Because the search engine and AdWord links to SF's
website are "independent and distinct" of the other search-returned links,
"potential consumers have no opportunity to confuse defendant's services, goods, advertisements, links or websites for those of [the] plaintiff"
find a likelihood of confusion"
and so, "no reasonable factfinder could
263
created by SF's use of the trademarks.
COPYRIGHT UPDATE

IV.
A.

10, INC.
Two ATTEMPTS AT PERFECT'S RESULT-PERFECT
2 64
v.

AMAZON.COM,

INC.

Internet search engines have become the table of contents for the mass
of information and media available on the Internet. The manner in which
this "table of contents" is created, organized, and displayed has led to a
variety of disputes as parties and courts attempt to apply long-established
intellectual property principles to novel uses of protected material. In
2006, the Central District of California entered a preliminary injunction
against Google, Inc. ("Google"), after finding that plaintiff Perfect 10,
Inc. ("Perfect 10") demonstrated a likelihood of success in its claim of
265
copyright infringement.
Google operates an Internet search engine, which automatically accesses and indexes numerous Internet websites. 266 In response to a query
entered at Google's own website, a user may obtain an index of relevant
websites tailored to his query.267 A user utilizing Google's website may
search for both text and images. 268 In response to a query for images,
Google's site may return not only links to relevant websites, but also miniaturized images, so that the user may browse the images before determining which sites to visit. 269 This is where Google's difficulties with
Perfect 10 begin.
260. Id. at 1786.
261. Id.
262. Id. (disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit's understanding of the function of a search
engine in Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc. v. West Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir.
1999)).
263. Id.
264. 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). While Amazon.com, Inc. is the first named
defendant, Google and its search engine were the primary focus of both the district court's
injunction and the Ninth Circuit opinion.
265. Id. at 1154.
266. Id. at 1155.
267. Id.

268. Id.
269. Id. at 1155-56.
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Perfect 10 owns rights to and sells images of models that were appearing on Google's website as part of the index resulting from user image
queries.2 70 Perfect 10 alleged that Google's image indexes infringed its
copyright in these images in several ways. 27 1 First, Google's search engine created smaller, lower resolution "thumbnail" copies of the images it
indexed. Also, Google would display the full size image in the user's
browser by embedding a reference to the indexed website's image within
Google's page. This way, users of Google's website were able to view an
image located on another website without leaving Google's website. Finally, many of the websites referenced by Google's image index were
themselves in violation of Perfect 10's copyright. 272
Although the Ninth Circuit commended the district court's treatment
of the issues, 273 while also choosing to amend its own opinion, 274 the
Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's injunction and remanded the
case for further factual findings. 275 Agreeing with the "server test" used
by the district court, the Ninth Circuit found that the "thumbnail" images
utilized by Google infringed Perfect 10's copyright, while the embedded
references used to display the full-sized images did not.2 76 This was because the "thumbnail" was a copy of the copyrighted image stored on and
displayed from Google's server, whereas Google made no copy of the
full-sized images, but instead utilized the embedded reference to fetch the
image from the server on which it resided. 277
Having determined that the "thumbnail" images infringed Perfect 10's
copyright, the Ninth Circuit next assessed Google's fair use defense and
overturned the district court's assessment, relying heavily on its previous
decision in Kelly v. Ariba Soft Corp.278 The Ninth Circuit found that the
first fair use factor, the purpose and character of the use, heavily favored
Google rather than Perfect 10.279 The court found that Google's use of
thumbnail images to create an index of images was "highly transformative" and provided "public benefit," which outweighed the commercial
nature of the use and the potential of the thumbnail image to supersede
Perfect 10's proposed sale of the images for display on cell phones. 28 0
Perfect 10 also stressed the sale of images to cell phones in arguments
270. Id. at 1157.
271. See id. at 1155-57.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 1155.
274. While the Ninth Circuit initially issued its opinion on May 16, 2007, it amended the
opinion on December 3, 2007. The primary change was to alter its holding that Perfect 10
bore the burden of showing Google infringement was not fair use. Cf. Perfect 10, Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007). Citing precedent that "the burdens at the
preliminary injunction stage track the burdens at trial," the court concluded that once Perfect 10 showed a likelihood of success on the merits, Google was required to show a likelihood that its affirmative fair use defense would succeed. Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1158.
275. Id. at 1177.
276. Id. at 1159-60.
277. Id. at 1159-61.
278. Id. at 1163-68 (citing Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003)).
279. Id. at 1167.
280. Id. at 1164-67.
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regarding the fourth fair use factor, effect of use on the market. 2 81 The
court, however, twice noted that the record described no actual
downloads and that the "potential harm . . . remains hypothetical,"
thereby finding the factor to be neutral rather than in Perfect 10's
favor. 282 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit concluded that Google's fair
use defense was likely to succeed and vacated the district court's prelimi283
nary injunction.

Google did not escape unscathed, however, since the Fourth Circuit
considered Google's potential contributory liability for the display of infringing images by third party websites. First, the court pointed to the
Supreme Court's decision in MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., which

divided contributory liability into two categories: actively encouraging infringement or distributing a product used to infringe copyrights without a
substantial noninfringing use.284 Because "intent may be imputed,"
Google had potential liability under the first category. 285 Looking also to
its own decision in A &M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., the Ninth Circuit
held that "a computer system operator can be held contributorily liable if
it 'has actual knowledge that specific infringing material is available using
its system,' and can 'take simple measures to prevent further damage' to
copyrighted works, yet continues to provide access to infringing
works. '286 The district court had not applied this test and more facts
the
were needed to make a determination, so the Ninth Circuit remanded
287
issue of Google's contributory liability for further consideration.
B.

FIGHT AT THE END OF THE TUBE-VIACOM

v.

INTERNATIONAL, INC.

YouTUBE, INC.,

Another Google entity, YouTube, Inc. ("YouTube"), also raises old
copyright issues through use of a new technology. YouTube hosts a website where users may upload video and also view video that has been
uploaded by others.2 88 Once again, some of the content appearing on the
site is copyrighted. This copyrighted content has once again made
Google the target of suit for direct, contributory, and vicarious infringement, including a recent case by Viacom International, Inc. ("Viacom")
in the Southern District of New York, alleging over $1 billion in damages. 289 Viacom is a media conglomerate whose affiliates include MTV
281. Id. at 1168.
282. Id. at 1166, 1168.

283. See id. at 1168-75.
284. Id. at 1170 (citing Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S.

913 (2005)).
285. Id. at 1171.
286. Id. at 1172 (citing A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.
2001)).

287. Id. at 1172-73.
288. John E. Ottaviani and Glenn Pudelka, YouTube Suit Raises Novel Internet Copyright Issues, IPLaw360, PORTFOLIO MEDIA, Mar. 26, 2007.
289. See Amanda Ernst, YouTube, Google Face Class Action Infringement Suit,
IPLaw360, PORTFOLIO MEDIA, May 7, 2007 (also discussing other copyright suits against

YouTube, Inc.).
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Networks, Comedy Partners, Country Music Television, Inc., Paramount
Pictures Corp., and Black Entertainment Television LLC.290
In addition to the heft of the entities and potential damages at stake,
Viacom v. YouTube has generated interest due to its potential to interpret
two, recent, landmark pieces of copyright law: (1) the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act ("DMCA"), passed by Congress in 1998,291 and (2) the
Supreme Court's 2005 decision in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v.
292
Grokster, Ltd.
Google and YouTube have asserted that they are protected by the
DMCA's safe harbor provisions, appearing in 17 U.S.C. § 512.293 Within
§ 512, it is the third safe harbor, for "information residing on systems or
networks at direction of users" that may apply to YouTube. 294 However,
YouTube must establish that it meets several conditions in order to be
protected. 295 First, the safe harbor applies to "service providers" and it is
not clear that YouTube meets the term as intended by the drafters. 296
Next, YouTube must show that (1) either YouTube has no actual knowledge of infringing material and that YouTube is not aware of facts or
circumstances that would make infringing activity apparent (often referred to as "red flags") or that upon obtaining knowledge, YouTube acts
to remove access to the infringing material; (2) YouTube does not directly
benefit financially from infringing activity that YouTube has the right and
ability to control; and (3) upon notification of infringing activity. YouTube acts "expeditiously " to remove access to the infringing material. 297
Additionally, YouTube has been accused of contributory and vicarious
infringement, in addition to direct infringement. 298 It has not been established whether the DMCA safe harbor applies to indirect
2 99
infringement.
In contrast, the Supreme Court opinion in Grokster dealt directly with
indirect infringement. 30 0 Although Grokster dealt with cases and copyright issues decided well after the passage of the DMCA, it did not address the DMCA or its safe harbors. Instead, it addressed the use of
technology to copy and disseminate copyrighted works in violation of the
owner's copyright in the context of music, rather than video.3 0 Grokster
addressed prior Supreme Court precedent in Sony Corp. of America v.
290. See Ottaviani, supra note 287; Our Brands:Strengthening the Bond With Our Audiences in Every Way, Viacom Inc., http://www.viacom.com/ourbrands/Pages/default.aspx.
291. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000).
292. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
293. Defs.' Answer at 10, Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07-cv-02103
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2007).
294. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).

295. Id.
296. Id.
297. See § 512(c)(1).
298. Pls.' Compl. at 21-25, Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07-cv-02103
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2007).
299. See Ottaviani, supra note 288.
300. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 929-30 (2005).
301. See id. at 919-21.
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Universal City Studios, Inc. (involving a copying and sharing technology:
the influential Ninth Circuit decision in A&M Records v.
VCRs) and
30 2
Napster.
In the Grokster opinion by Justice Souter, the Court concluded that
"one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe a copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps
taken to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties. '30 3 Further, the Court held that this rule "premises
liability on purposeful, culpable expression and conduct, and thus does
nothing to compromise legitimate commerce or discourage innovation
having a lawful promise. '30 4 Interestingly, the decision seemed to preat
serve the "substantial noninfringing use" defense created by Sony,
30 5
infringement.
cause
to
intent
of
evidence
of
absence
the
least in
While Viacom v. You Tube presents many of the same issues that are at
the forefront of developing copyright law, these issues may not be adtime. Discovery is not scheduled to condressed by the court for some
06
2008.3
of
end
clude until the
V. CONCLUSION
Intellectual property continues to escalate in importance to the world,
United States, Texas, and East Texas economies. With that rising importance comes increased scrutiny. 2008 will be another significant year in
the ongoing development of our intellectual property laws. At the state
level, Texas will continue to be instrumental in the development of intellectual property law-from the first applications of the new patent rules
of the Northern and Southern District of Texas, to the Eastern District of
Texas addressing some of the challenges incident to its popularity as a
patent litigation venue. At the national level, the Supreme Court has
made a concerted effort to harmonize patent law with the law in general
and the lower courts are taking notice. Copyright laws will continue to be
examined and interpreted in light of user-posted video sites like YouTube, and their implementation as news sources, such as with CNN's iReport. Technology is pushing the economy in new directions with everincreasing speed and the laws governing intellectual property are constantly evolving to keep up.

302. See id. at 924, 927 (discussing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
464 U.S. 417 (1984) and A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir.
2001)).
303. Id. at 936-37.
304. Id. at 937.
305. Id. at 939 n.12.
306. Scheduling Order at 4, Viacom Int'l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., No. 07-cv-02103
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2007).
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